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ABSTRACT 
Bioterrorism is not a new threat, but the potential for disastrous outcomes is greater than 
it has ever been.  In order to confront this threat, biosurveillance systems are utilized to 
provide early warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and situational 
awareness of disease activity.  To date, there is little known about the performance of 
such biosurveillance systems in comparison to diagnosis capabilities of medical 
personnel.  In this thesis, a discrete event simulation model of an anthrax outbreak is 
developed in order to analyze the performance of such biosurveillance systems in 
comparison to medical personnel.  This research found the Early Aberration Reporting 
System C1 statistical algorithm is useful in early event detection of a bioterror attack. 
Given an exposed population of 1,000 people, the nominal probability that the algorithm 
signals first is 31.5% and it is 0.3% for an exposed population of 10,000 people. Given an 
exposed population of 1,000 people, the nominal time it takes for the algorithm to signal 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Bioterrorism is not a new threat, but the potential for disastrous outcomes is greater than 
it has ever been. The U.S. government recognizes the threat and, via Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21), has directed “further improvement in the 
preparedness of our public health and medical systems to address current and future 
biological warfare threats and to respond with greater speed and flexibility to multiple or 
repetitive attacks” (HSPD-21, 2007).  In order to confront this threat, biosurveillance 
systems are utilized to provide early warning of health threats, early detection of health 
events, and situational awareness of disease activity.  To date, there is little known about 
the performance of such biosurveillance systems in comparison to medical personnel.  An 
open question is under what conditions does biosurveillance tends to detect an outbreak 
more quickly than medical personnel?  
The methodology used to answer this question is discrete event simulation of an 
anthrax outbreak using the Java programming language.  In order to design the simulation 
in this thesis, a review of Professor Fricker's and Buckeridge's simulations was 
conducted.  The Fricker simulation is too simplistic in its design while the Buckeridge 
simulation is too detailed. Therefore, the design of the simulation in this thesis seeks to 
be more realistic than Fricker, but also more generalizable than Buckeridge.  The goal is 
to explore the performance of the EARS' C1 statistical detection algorithm versus 
medical personnel with the following questions in mind:  
(1) Can the C1 statistical algorithm used in the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention's Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) be useful/effective for early 
event detection (EED) in comparison to medical personnel? If so, under what conditions? 
(2) What factors most affect the performance of such an algorithm, in the sense 
that it results in either C1 algorithm or medical personnel performing significantly better 
than the other?  
To address these questions, two response variables were modeled and analyzed: 
the probability the C1 algorithm signals first and the number of days it takes for the C1 
 xvi
algorithm to signal.  The evaluation was conducted for two scenarios: one for an initial 
exposed population of 1,000 people and one for 10,000 exposed people.  In the worst 
case scenarios, the probability the algorithm signals first is 13.04% for an exposed 
population of 1,000 people and it is 0.03% for an exposed population of 10,000 people.  
In the nominal case scenarios, the probability the algorithm signals first is 31.5% for an 
exposed population of 1,000 people and it is 0.3% for an exposed population of 10,000 
people.  In the worst case scenarios, the longest time it takes for the algorithm to signal is 
6.63 days for an exposed population of 1,000 people and 4.14 days for an exposed 
population of 10,000 people.  In the nominal case scenarios, the time it takes for the 
algorithm to signal is 3.3 days for an exposed population of 1,000 people and 0.38 days 
for an exposed population of 10,000 people.    
The parameters with the largest effect on the probability the algorithm signals first 
are:  the probability an individual is infected with Anthrax, the probability a non-infected 
individual goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu, and the daily increase in the 
probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed.  An increase in the threshold 
and the transitional probabilities of people getting infected, going to the hospital for non-
anthrax related flu and correct diagnosis by doctor all decrease the probability the 
algorithm signals first, and thus increase the probability the doctor signals first. This 
finding is consistent with Professor Fricker’s simulation results in the sense that as the 
probability of correct diagnosis by doctor increases, the probability the statistical 
algorithm detects the outbreak decreases.   
The parameters with the largest effect on the number of days to algorithm signal 
are: the probability an individual is infected, the probability a non-infected individual 
goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu, and the daily increase in the probability 
an infected person goes to the hospital. An increase in the transitional probabilities of 
people getting infected, going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu and an infected 
person goes to the hospital result in an increase in the time it takes for the algorithm to 
signal.   
This research shows that biosurveillance statistical algorithms, such as the EARS 
C1, are useful in EED of a bioterror attack.  Although the probability the algorithm 
 xvii
signals first may seem low, note that whether the algorithm signaled first was quite 
situation dependent.  And even in the worst case scenario for 1,000 exposed people, the 
algorithm signaled first more than one time in ten.  Thus, at the very least biosurveillance 
is an effective back-up to clinicians.  On the other hand, there were scenarios in which the 
statistical algorithm almost always signaled first.  Follow on research that can build upon 
this thesis are: evaluating different population sizes, investigating the effects of a wider 
range for the simulation parameters, comparing the performance among other statistical 
algorithms, and exploring the parameters that have a significant effect on the number of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Bioterrorism is not a new threat, but the potential for disastrous outcomes is 
greater than it has ever been. The U.S. government recognizes the threat and, via 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21), has directed “further 
improvement in the preparedness of our public health and medical systems to address 
current and future biological warfare threats and to respond with greater speed and 
flexibility to multiple or repetitive attacks” (HSPD-21, 2007).  In order to confront this 
threat, biosurveillance systems are utilized to provide early warning of health threats, 
early detection of health events, and situational awareness of disease activity.  To date, 
little is known about the performance of such biosurveillance systems in comparison to 
medical personnel.  An open question is under what conditions does biosurveillance tend 
to detect an outbreak more quickly than medical personnel? 
This thesis addresses this question via a discrete event simulation of an anthrax-
based bioterrorism attack.  The goal is to use an idealized model of health-seeking 
behaviors and medical outcomes of an affected population to assess the relative 
performance of biosurveillance versus medical personnel in detecting the attack. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Biosurveillance 
HSPD-21 defines biosurveillance as “the process of active data-gathering with 
appropriate analysis and interpretation of biosphere data that might relate to disease 
activity and threats to human or animal health whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or 
otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural origin” (HSPD-21, 2007).  There are 
three types of biosurveillance: human (epidemiologic) surveillance, animal (zoonotic) 
surveillance, and agricultural surveillance.  Syndromic surveillance is a specific type of 
epidemiological surveillance that has been defined as “the ongoing, systematic collection, 
analysis, interpretation, and application of real-time (or near-real-time) indicators of 
diseases and outbreaks that allow for their detection before public health authorities 
would otherwise note them.” (Sosin, 2003)   
 2
Syndromic surveillance differs from the traditional epidemiologic surveillance in 
a number of ways: it uses health-related data, such as counts of individuals coming into 
medical facilities, over-the-counter medication sales, and aggregate laboratory test 
results. The data are prediagnostic or prior to case confirmation. Syndromic surveillance 
is not supposed to provide a definitive determination that an outbreak is occurring but 
only to signal that an outbreak maybe occurring (Fricker & Rolka, 2006).   
2. Biosurveillance Systems 
While there are different types of biosurveillance systems currently in operation, 
they all share a common goal of improving the chances of detecting an outbreak early. 
All of them have four main functions: data collection, data management, analysis, and 
reporting.  Three large-scale systems currently in use are BioSense, ESSENCE, and 
EARS.  
BioSense.  Launched in 2003 as a result of the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, its purpose is to establish an 
integrated national public health surveillance system for early detection and rapid 
assessment of potential bioterrorism-related illness.   Developed and operated by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2010 the CDC started redesigning 
the BioSense program based on input and guidance from local, state, and federal partners. 
The goal of the redesign effort is to be able to provide nationwide and regional situational 
awareness for all-hazard health-related threats (beyond bioterrorism) and to support 
national, state, and local responses to those threats (CDC, 2010a). 
ESSENCE.  An acronym for Electronic Surveillance System for the Early 
Notification of Community-based Epidemics, ESSENCE was developed starting in 1999 
and is operated by the Department of Defense.  It monitors infectious disease outbreaks at 
more than 300 military treatment facilities worldwide on a daily basis using data from 
patient visits to the facilities and pharmacy data (Fricker, 2010). 
EARS.  An acronym for Early Aberration Reporting System, EARS was 
developed by the CDC. It was pioneered as a method for monitoring bioterrorism during 
large-scale events where there is little or no "baseline" data.   Following the terrorist 
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attacks of September 11, 2001, various city, county, and state public health officials in 
the United States and abroad have adopted EARS for routine health surveillance using 
syndromic and other data from emergency departments, reportable conditions, 911 calls, 
physician office data, school and business absenteeism, and over-the-counter drug sales 
(CDC, 2010b). 
All of the systems rely on statistical algorithms to trigger an outbreak signal, so 
that public health official can take appropriate actions.  However, little is known about 
how such a system is likely to perform, particularly in comparison to medical personnel. 
Furthermore, there are many statistical issues that remain to be resolved.  One of the 
issues is: When do statistical methods add value to the existing medical infrastructure and 
under what conditions?   
As shown in Figure 1, Fricker and Rolka (2006) suggest that if the outbreak is 
sufficiently large, geographically concentrated, and/or easy to diagnose, then a doctor is 
likely to be equally fast or faster at detecting an outbreak than a statistical algorithm.  In 
contrast, if the outbreak is very small and/or diffuse, then a statistical algorithm operated 
in isolation is unlikely to detect the outbreak.  In the case of a moderately sized outbreak 
that is easy to diagnose, a doctor’s diagnosis will be faster than a statistical algorithm.  
The result of these restrictions is that statistical methods are likely to add value only 
when an outbreak is large and/or concentrated enough to statistically detect, but not so 
large that the outbreak is obvious, combined with the situation where identification of the 
type of outbreak is sufficiently hard to diagnose, making the doctor likely to miss it for 
some time (Fricker & Rolka, 2006).  Therefore, biosurveillance can potentially serve as 
primary detection tool for a rare and hard to diagnose disease or agent and a 
supplementary tool to medical personnel for a moderately sized outbreak that is 




Figure 1.   When is syndromic surveillance useful for outbreak detection? From 
Fricker and Rolka (2006) 
3. Anthrax Overview 
Anthrax, Bacillus Anthracis, has been used as a biological weapon dating back to 
World War I as a means to cause economic havoc through the loss of livestock. (Grey & 
Spaeth, 2006).  During World War II, the Japanese government formed the research unit 
731 at Pingfen to conduct research on anthrax weaponization using prisoners of war as 
test subjects.  It is believed that Japan employed anthrax in its campaign against 
Manchuria, releasing spores into the atmosphere over the area (Zubay, 2005).   
In response to these threats, Britain and United States launched biological 
weapons initiatives to conduct extensive research on anthrax.  In 1942, Britain performed 
extensive testing at Gruinard Island, off the coast of Scotland by detonating bombs hung 
on scaffolding structures and examining the extent of contamination of the surrounding 
area.  In 1943, the United States established a pilot plant at Camp Detrick to produce 
biological weapons and manufactured 5,000 bombs filled with anthrax spores    
(Christopher et al., 1997).   
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More recently in 1990, United Nations (UN) inspectors confirmed that Iraq had 
100 R400 bombs filled with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax, and 16 with aflatoxin. In 
all, they produced 8500 L of anthrax, 6500 L of which was weaponized into rockets and 
bombs (Zilinskas, 1997). From 1990 to 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released 
aerosolized anthrax and botulinum toxin on several occasions at the Diet (the legislature), 
the Imperial Palace, the U.S. Naval base at Yokosuka, and other places throughout Tokyo 
(Atlas, 2002).  The most recent use of anthrax as a biological weapon occurred in the 
United States in 2001, when unknown individual or group sent mails containing refined 
anthrax spores in the form of a highly concentrated dry powder to a variety of media 
institutions and governmental offices.  Of the 22 confirmed cases of anthrax, 11 were  
due to inhalational and five resulted in casualties.  The investigation revealed that the 
Ames strain of Bacillus Anthracis was used in the attack, and this strain was not 
developed on foreign soil, but rather by scientists associated with the U. S. Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (Zubay, 2005). 
Following the attacks in 2001, an attempt was made to statistically analyze data 
regarding symptoms in patients with inhalational anthrax and symptoms from influenza 
and ambulatory community-acquired pneumonia.  The goal was to develop a method to 
distinguish anthrax from influenza and pneumonia in the early stage of disease 
progression.  Hupert et al. (2003) compared 28 cases of inhalational anthrax, both modern 
and past occurrences, with more than 2700 cases of influenza and 149 cases of 
ambulatory community-acquired pneumonia.  The study revealed that abnormal lung 
examination, dyspnea, and nausea or vomiting are statistically greater indicators for 
anthrax, while sore throat and rhinorrhea1 are statistically greater indicators for influenza.  
Cough, chest pain, abnormal temperature, and headache did not demonstrate a statistical 
difference between anthrax and influenza. 
Anthrax is a disease associated mostly with herbivores and has three forms: 
cutaneous, gastrointestinal, and inhalational.  Cutaneous anthrax results from direct 
contact with infected livestock or livestock products.  Mortality for untreated cutaneous 
                                                 
1 Persistent watery mucus discharge from the nose, commonly referred to as runny nose. 
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anthrax is about 20%.  A pruritic red papular lesion2 is formed within one week of 
exposure to the spore.  Once the lesion enlarges and ruptures, it forms an ulcer covered 
by black eschar3, which then dries up and falls off within two weeks (Grey & Spaeth, 
2006).  Patients with cutaneous anthrax usually experience headaches and occasional 
fevers up to 102o F. Unlike the cutaneous form, gastrointestinal (GI) anthrax occurs from 
the deposition of vegetative bacilli from uncooked meat in the upper or lower portion of 
the GI track rather than from spore germination.  Oral or esophageal ulcers are developed 
at the initial site of bacterial deposition.  Patients usually experience nausea, vomiting, 
malaise initially and then bloody diarrhea, acute abdominal pain.  The actual case 
numbers for GI anthrax are extremely low, therefore no mortality statistic is available 
(Zubay, 2005).  
In Zubay (2005), inhalational anthrax is described as the most lethal form of the 
disease, which has a mortality rate of 80%.  It is contracted when spores are inhaled and 
deposited in the alveolar4.  The spores germinate into active bacilli in the mediastinal 
lymph nodes5. Human to human transmission of the disease is extremely rare, and would 
occur only through direct transfer of fluids containing the bacteria from one individual to 
another.  The symptoms of inhalational anthrax can be broken down into two stages. In 
the first stage, which normally last a few days, there are no clinically significant signs. 
Patients often exhibit only symptoms similar to those of flu and cold, making early 
diagnosis extremely difficult unless there is prior knowledge of an anthrax outbreak.  The 
second stage develops rapidly with onset of acute dyspnea6 and subsequent cyanosis7.  
The second stage normally lasts less than 24 hours and leads to death.   
Anthrax is considered one of the most dangerous and most likely agents that 
would be used in a bioterrorist attack due to hardiness of the spores, potency, and 
                                                 
2 A small, solid, circumscribed elevation characterized by an intense itching sensation. 
3 A piece of dead tissue that is cast off from the surface of the skin. 
4 The tiny air sacs of the lungs. 
5 Region behind the sternum and between the two pleural sacs containing the lungs. 
6 Shortness of breath, a subjective difficulty or distress in breathing. 
7 Bluish discoloration, especially of the skin and mucous membranes, caused by decreases in 
oxygenated hemoglobin. 
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availability.  The spore is extremely resistant to environmental stresses such as heat, cold, 
many chemical disinfectants, long dry spells, and low levels of ultraviolet light. It will 
grow rapidly in a nutrient-rich environment and when the nutrients are exhausted, rather 
than dying, the bacteria will form dormant spores, which is a method of preserving the 
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA) until conditions return to an optimal state for bacterial 
growth.  The hardiness of the spores requires extensive sterilization efforts and the 
aerosolized form has no odor, essentially colorless, and virtually undetectable.  The first 
sign that an attack has occurred will probably be the first diagnosis of a patient in a 
hospital.  Besides the hardiness of the spore form, anthrax is extremely potent and deadly 
bacteria with mortality rates as high as 80% (Zubay, 2005).   
In 1993, the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology examined a hypothetical 
bioterrorist attack utilizing aerosolized spores of Bacillus Anthracis.  The study 
concluded an estimated 130,000 to 3 million casualties would result in the event of an 
aerosolized release of 100 kg of anthrax spores upwind of Washington, DC (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1993). Anthrax is readily available throughout the world, will 
grow relatively easily on most laboratory media, and can also be aerosolized for mass 
destruction.  While anthrax possesses characteristics of an ideal biological weapon, it is 
more manageable from a biodefense perspective because it is not known to spread from 
person to person unless there is a direct transmission of bodily fluids, and there is very 
little risk from secondary aerosolization (Zubay, 2005).  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to develop an idealized discrete event simulation of an anthrax outbreak 
that is more realistic than Fricker, but also more generalizable than Buckeridge, a 
literature review of these two simulations is described in the following sections.  
1. A Simple Simulation 
In his short course, titled “Methodological Issues in Biosurveillance”, at the 
Twelfth Biennial CDC Symposium on Statistical Methods, Professor Fricker presented 
the results of a very simple bioterrorism attack simulation study.  As illustrated in Figure 
2, in Professor Fricker's simulation, on average, 100 people per day (with a standard 
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deviation of 20 people) go to the hospital with flu-like symptoms.  A bioterror attack 
results in X number of people exposed to a bio-agent also going to the hospital with flu-
like symptoms, thereby increasing the total number of people at the hospital with flu-like 
symptoms.  A CUSUM (cumulative sum) statistical algorithm monitors the average 
number of people going to the hospital with flu-like symptoms with a false signal rate 
fixed at once per 30 days.  The CUSUM algorithm will signal an outbreak if there is a 
statistically unusual increase.  Working concurrently with the CUSUM algorithm is a 
doctor who sees each patient and makes a diagnosis based on his or her expertise.  For 
those exposed to bio-agent, there is some probability p that the doctor will correctly 
diagnose the patient as not having the flu but rather as having been exposed to the bio-
agent.  The research question for this simple simulation is, what is the probability the 
clinician diagnoses a case of the bio-agent before the CUSUM algorithm signals? 
(Fricker, 2009, and Fricker, 2011) 
 
Figure 2.   A simple simulation. From Fricker (2009)  
The simulation results can be summarized as the higher the probability of correct 
diagnosis by doctor (p), the higher the probability the clinician will detect an outbreak 
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before the CUSUM signals.  As shown in Figure 3, if p is 0.01 and X (the number 
exposed to the bio-agent) is between 8 and 50 per day, then there is a 50% chance the 
clinician will detect first. If p is increased to 0.025 and same value for X, then there is a 
75% chance the clinician will detect first.  If p is 0.05 and X is between 10 and 50 per 
day, then there is a 90–95% chance the clinician will detect first.  
 
Figure 3.   Simple simulation results A. From Fricker (2009) 
Consistent with Fricker and Rolka (2006), and as shown in Figure 4, Professor 
Fricker’s simulation results suggest there is a role for statistical algorithms in 
biosurveillance when the pathogen is hard to diagnose and /or when small numbers of 
bio-agent are present at the hospital.  While this simulation is simplistic with only two 
parameters p and X, it motivates a more detailed simulation that expands the model, 




Figure 4.   Simple simulation results B. From Fricker (2009) 
2. Evaluating Detection of an Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak 
In his paper titled “Evaluating Detection of an Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak,” 
Professor Buckeridge conducted a simulation study to compare clinical case finding with 
syndromic surveillance for detection of an outbreak of inhalational anthrax (the deadliest 
type with mortality rate of 80%).   His aim was to develop a model for simulating the 
usage of healthcare services after a large-scale exposure to aerosol anthrax spores and 
then to use this model to estimate the detection benefit of syndromic surveillance when 
compared with the clinical case finding.   
The simulation design consists of four parts: dispersion of released anthrax 
spores, infection of exposed persons, progression of disease in infected persons, and 
symptomatic persons’ use of the health care system.  The dispersion model simulates the 
number of anthrax spores a person would inhale at locations throughout the region after 
release of aerosolized spores using the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 
(HPAC) software developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The 
infection of exposed person model simulates the number of persons infected using a 
 11
semi-Markov process to simulate the progression through three discrete states of disease.  
Each infected person begins in the incubation8 state and then progresses through the 
prodromal9 state and the fulminant 10 state. The time in each state is sampled from a log 
normal distribution.  The usage of health care system model uses a semi-Markov process 
to simulate the probability and timing of a symptomatic person seeking care and 
submission of blood for culture.  For patients who are in the prodromal or fulminant state, 
the probability of seeking care increases linearly over the duration of the state. For 
patients whose blood samples are cultured, the testing process transitions through two 
states: growth and isolation. The time spent in these two states is modeled using an 
exponential distribution.  
Three anthrax release scenarios were explored: 1kg, 0.1kg, and 0.01 kg. For each 
scenario, 1000 simulations were conducted.  The evaluation metrics of outbreak detection 
through syndromic surveillance consists of sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness at a 
range of decision thresholds.  Sensitivity is the probability of correctly detecting an 
attack, specificity is the probability of not signaling when there is no attack, and 
timeliness is a measure of the duration between the release of anthrax spores and the first 
report of an outbreak.  The results of the simulation suggest that syndromic surveillance 
could detect an inhalational anthrax outbreak before clinical case finding. With a 
simulated 1kg of anthrax spores release, the proportion of outbreaks detected first by 
syndromic surveillance was 0.59 at a specificity of 0.9 and 0.28 at a specificity of 0.995.  
When syndromic surveillance was highly sensitive to detect a substantial proportion of 
outbreaks before clinical case finding, it generated frequent false alarms.  The syndromic 
surveillance system’s ability to detect was influenced by both specificity and release size, 
with specificity being the predominant factor. There was a tradeoff between sensitivity 
and specificity of syndromic surveillance.  In order to reduce the false alarm rate,  
 
                                                 
8 The time from the moment of exposure to an infectious agent until signs and symptoms of the disease 
appear. 
9 Early symptom or set of symptoms that might indicate the start of a disease before specific symptoms 
occur. 
10 Sudden and severe to the point of lethality. 
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specificity must be high. However, as specificity is increased, sensitivity is decreased, 
and the proportion of outbreaks that was detected first by syndromic surveillance 
decreased more significantly (Buckeridge, 2006).   
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
Fricker’s simulation is too simplistic in its design while Buckeridge’s simulation 
is too detailed in its design. The Fricker simulation only has two parameters: X (number 
exposed to the bio-agent) and p (probability the doctor diagnoses correctly).  
Additionally, the probability of correct diagnosis by the doctor remains the same as time 
progresses. In contrast, the Buckeridge simulation is too detailed with many parameters 
in both the dispersion model and the health care usage model. For each parameter value, 
there are three sets of value intervals due to three anthrax release scenarios of 1kg, 0.1kg, 
and 0.01 kg, and they are drawn from various probability distributions such as the log-
normal, Bernoulli and exponential.  If a simulation is too simple or too detailed, then it is 
difficult to gain some insights into what are the main factors that affect whether an 
algorithm or clinician is likely to signal an outbreak first. Therefore, the scope of this 
thesis is to develop an idealized discrete event simulation of an anthrax outbreak that is 
more realistic than Fricker, but also more generalizable than Buckeridge.  In order to 
explore the performance of the statistical detection algorithm versus medical personnel, 
this thesis will endeavor to answer these questions:  
(1) Can the statistical algorithm be useful/effective for early event detection 
(EED) in comparison to medical personnel? If so, under what conditions? 
(2) What factors most affect the performance of such an algorithm, in the sense 
that it results in either the algorithm or medical personnel performing significantly better 
than the other?  
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II. SIMULATION MODEL  
A. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION 
Discrete event simulation (DES) is a powerful computing technique for 
understanding the behavior of a system.  The operation of such a system is represented as 
a chronological sequence of events.  Each event occurs at a discrete point in time and 
marks a change of state in the system.  The elements of a DES are states, events, and 
scheduling relationships between events.  A state variable in a DES model has a 
possibility of changing value at least once during any given simulation run.  In contrast, a 
parameter variable does not change during a simulation run.  Events are the building 
blocks in a DES model.  Events are responsible for changing a few state variables 
(possibly none) or many state variables.  Once the state transition is done in an event, it 
will schedule every possible future event. This is the scheduling relationship between 
events.   
The method of time advance in a DES model is called "next event."  Simulation 
time moves in typically unequal increments, jumping from the scheduled time of one 
event to another.  Figure 5 shows that at the start of a simulation, the initial event is 
scheduled, which is responsible for initializing all state variables as well as scheduling 
any initial real events of the model.  If there are pending events, then simulation time is 
advanced to the earliest scheduled event, the previous event is removed from the event 
list, all  state transitions associated with the event are executed  and the scheduling of  
any events as specified by the model are performed (Buss, 2010).   
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Figure 5.   Next event flow chart. From Buss (2010) 
An event graph is used to depict the scheduling relationship between events.  
Each graph consists of nodes and directed edges. Each node corresponds to an event, or 
state transition, and each edge corresponds to the scheduling of other events.  Each edge 
can optionally have an associated Boolean condition and/or a time delay. Figure 6 shows 
that the occurrence of Event A causes Event B to be scheduled after a time delay of t, 
providing condition (i) is true (Buss, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.   Fundamental event graph construct. From Buss (2010). 
B. EARS' C1 ALGORITHM 
As described in Fricker et al. (2008), EARS’ event detection methods are called 
“C1-MILD”, “C2-MEDIUM”, and “C3-ULTRA”.  The C1 method uses the seven days 
prior to the current observation to calculate the sample average and sample standard 
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deviation of a syndrome daily count for day t.  This thesis only applies the C1 method 
and uses daily number of people going to the hospital and being classified with flu 









• Y(t) is the observed number of people at hospital for day t 

























As implemented in EARS, the C1 method signals an outbreak at time t when the 
C1 statistic exceeds a fixed threshold of three sample standard deviations from the 
sample mean.   
C. OUTBREAK SIMULATION MODEL 
1. Simulation Design 
The goal of the simulation design is to gain insights on which outbreak signal (C1 
EARS algorithm or the doctor) occurs first as a function of certain parameters.  The 
approach is to come up with a conceptual design pictorially first, then translates the 
design into a simplified event graph, and finally into a detailed event graph.  The Java 
programming language with the Simkit library is used to write and execute the outbreak 
simulation code.  
Figure 7 illustrates the design of an outbreak simulation model pictorially.  At the 
start of the simulation, the entire population is susceptible to some disease.  Given the 
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susceptible population, a person can remain susceptible, or go to the hospital with flu-like 
symptom, or become infected.  Given a bioterror attack occurs, an infected person (bio-
agent) will go to the hospital seeking care.  At the hospital, the doctors see each patient 
and make a diagnosis. If the doctor correctly diagnoses the patient, then he or she will 
signal an outbreak.  If the doctor misdiagnoses the bio-agent, then that person is still 
infected and returns to the infected pool of individuals.  The C1 algorithm monitors the 
average number of people going to the hospital with flu-like symptoms (which consists of 
the sum of those going to the hospital with the flu and those with flu-like symptoms 
resulting from exposure to the bioterrorism agent) and signals an outbreak, if there is a 
statistically unusual increase, at which point C1 is greater than the specified threshold.   
 
Figure 7.   A more realistic simulation 
In Figure 8, the conceptual design is translated into a simplified event graph.  
Each node corresponds to an event such as Susceptible, Stay Susceptible or Go To 
 17
Hospital. Each directed edge corresponds to the scheduling of other events.  At the 
beginning of the simulation, the entire population is susceptible to some disease.  Given 
the susceptible population, a person can stay susceptible, go to the hospital with flu-like 
symptoms, or become infected with the bioterrorism agent.  A bioterror attack happens, 
an infected person may go to the hospital seeking care.  Given a person is infected and 
goes to the hospital, a doctor will perform diagnosis. If the doctor diagnoses the patient 
correctly, he/she will signal an outbreak. If the doctor misdiagnoses, the patient remains 
infected and no signal is generated.  The C1 algorithm will signal that there is an unusual 
increase of number of people going to the hospital is the C1 statistic exceeds some 
prespecified threshold.  The number of people going to the hospital used in the C1 
statistic calculation represents the people who show up to the hospital from the 
susceptible population and the infected population. 
 
Figure 8.   Simplified event graph 
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The final step before writing the simulation code is drawing a detailed event 
graph with its corresponding parameters (which will not change during a simulation run),  
state variables (which will change at least once during a simulation run), state transitions, 
and the scheduling relationships between events.  Four Java classes: PatientCreator, 
Patient, Outbreak, and RunOutbreak are created to model the bioterrorism attack. Figures 
9 and 10 depict the detailed event graph for the Outbreak class.   
 
Figure 9.   Detailed event graph with parameters and state variables 
The PatientCreator and Patient Java classes are responsible for creating a patient 
object and keeping track of how long each patient has been infected prior to seeing the 
doctor at the hospital.  How long each patient has been infected will have an impact on 
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two transitional probabilities: the probability of correct diagnosis by the doctor and the 
probability of going to the hospital seeking care given a person is infected.  This 
simulation model uses the same approach as in Buckeridge’s simulation in the sense that 
the probability of seeking care increases linearly over the duration of the state.  
Additionally, the longer a person stays infected, the probability of correct diagnosis by 
the doctor also increases linearly since the symptoms are becoming more obvious.  
 
Figure 10.   Detailed event graph with state transitions, events and scheduling 
relationships between events 
The Outbreak Java class incorporates the detailed event graph from Figures 9 and 
10.  It contains the simulation’s parameters, state variables, state transitions, events and 
the scheduling relationships between events.   
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a. Parameters 
There are six parameters in the simulation model. Population size (n) is a 
number representing the population size, which is specified at the beginning of an 
outbreak simulation run. The population sizes simulated in this thesis are 1,000 or 10,000 
people.  The transitional probabilities are x1 and x2, where x1 is the probability of 
transitioning from susceptible to infected and x2 is the probability a susceptible person 
goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu symptoms.  The threshold (x3) is used as a 
parameter for an algorithm signal when C1 is greater than the specified threshold.  The 
maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to be correctly diagnosed by 
the doctor is x7, and the maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to go 
to the hospital seeking care is x6.  Table 1 is the simulation parameters with their name, 




x1 double 0.001 to 0.1 probability of transitioning from susceptible to 
infected 
x2 double 0.001 to 0.1 probability a susceptible person goes to 
hospital for non-anthrax related flu symptoms 
x3 double 2 to 3 threshold 
x7 double 7 to 21 maximum number of days an infected person 
is guaranteed to be correctly diagnosed 
x6 double 14 to 28 maximum number of days an infected person 
is guaranteed to go to hospital seeking care 
n integer 1000 or 10000 population size 
Table 1.   Simulation parameters 
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b. State Variables 
The state variables can be broken down in five different groups: 
transitional probabilities, an aggregate count, a daily count, time in the infected state, and 
other.  The probability of an infected person going to the hospital seeking care is x5 and 
the probability of correct diagnosis by the doctor is x4.  The initial values for these 
probabilities start out at 0 and increases linearly over time up to 1.  There are three state 
variables to keep track of an aggregate count: total number susceptible (S) with initial 
value equal to the population size, total number infected (I) with initial value of 0, and 
total number show up at hospital (H) with initial value of 0.  For the daily count, there are 
three state variables with initial values of 0: number susceptible each day (St), number 
infected each day (It), and number at hospital each day (Ht).  The state variable that keeps 
track of how long each patient is infected before he or she shows up at the hospital is T1, 
which has direct impact in updating the probability of correct diagnosis by the doctor (x4) 
and the probability of an infected person going to the hospital seeking care (x5).  The last 
groups of state variables are tA and tD, which record the time of the algorithm or doctor 
signal of an outbreak.  The Boolean state variables associated with tA and tD are algorithm 
signal (A) and doctor signal (D), which has an initial value of false.  Finally, d represents 
the current day in the simulation, letting all patient objects know what day it is.  The state 
variable outbreakStart is the day the outbreak occurs with a value of 7.  In the simulation, 
an outbreak does not occur until 7 days has gone by.  It is necessary to collect data for 7 
days in order to use them in the C1 algorithm.  Table 2 is the simulation state variables 









Name Java type Description 
S integer total number susceptible (initial value is population size) 
I integer total number infected (initial value of 0) 
H integer total number at hospital (initial value of 0) 
St integer 
array 








an array to store number at hospital on each day (size of 
1000) 
T1 double keep track of how long each patient has been infected 
x5 double probability of transitioning from infected to hospital (initial 
value of 0), gets updated as the day progresses 
x4 double probability of correct diagnosis by doctor (initial value of 
0), gets updated as the day progresses 
tA double record the time of an algorithm signal (initial value of 0) 
tD double record the time of a doctor signal (initial value of 0) 
A Boolean algorithm signal (initial value of false) 
D Boolean  doctor signal (initial value of false) 
C1 double store the value of C1 statistic of the EARS algorithm 
d integer the current day  (initial value of 0) 
outbreakStart integer the day an outbreak occur (initial value of 7) 
Table 2.   Simulation state variables 
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c. Events and State Transitions 
Each node in Figure 10 (detailed event graph) represents an event, which 
corresponds to a public method in the Outbreak class.  Underneath each event node is the 
associated state transition or transitions, where certain state variables will be updated 
during the simulation run.  A typical sequence of events can be summarized as: one event 
occurs (i.e. Susceptible), state transitions are performed for that event, and the next event 
is scheduled. 
(1) The Reset and Run event.  The Reset event is responsible for 
setting the initial values of all state variables at the start of the simulation.  The Run event 
is responsible for scheduling the arrival of each patient into the system. It will stop 
scheduling the arrival of the patients once it reaches the population size.  Additionally, it 
has an End of Day event, where at the end of each day in the simulation, it is scheduled to 
record: the number of susceptible (St), the number of infected (It), and the number of 
people showing up at the hospital (Ht).  Once the daily counts are recorded, End of Day 
event will increase numDay (d) by 1, which advances the simulation to the next day.    
(2) The Becomes Susceptible and Susceptible event.  The Becomes 
Susceptible event is a bookkeeping event, where the occurrence of this event will 
increment the total number of Susceptible (S) by 1.  The Susceptible event is responsible 
for scheduling other events.  Given a susceptible person, he or she can either remain 
susceptible, or go to the hospital, or become infected.  The total transitional probabilities 
for these three events add up to 1.  The scheduling of these three events depends on the 
result of drawing a random uniform variable U (0, 1).  If U is less than or equal to x1 (the 
probability of transitioning from susceptible to infected) and d (the current day) is greater 
than or equal to outbreakStart (has value of 7), then the person will transition to the 
Infected event, meaning he or she has gone from being Susceptible to being Infected.  
The second part of the conditional statement where d is greater than or equal to 
outbreakStart ensures that no one can be infected until a bioterror attack happens, which 
occurs at day 7.  If U is greater x1 and U is less than or equal to the sum of x1 (the 
probability of transitioning from susceptible to infected) and x2 (the probability a 
susceptible person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu symptoms), then the 
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person will transition to the Susceptible To Hospital event, meaning a susceptible person 
decides to go to the hospital seeking care.  If a susceptible person does not go to the 
hospital or becomes infected, then he or she remains susceptible to a disease.   
(3) The Susceptible To Hospital event.  State transitions and the 
calculation of C1 statistic are performed in this event.  If a person shows up to this event, 
he or she comes from the susceptible population.  This event will increment the total 
number at hospital (H) by 1 and decrement the total number susceptible (S) by 1.  It will 
call the calculateC1() helper method to figure out the value of C1 statistic at that time. If 
C1 is greater than x3 (threshold), it will schedule an ALGO Signal event.  This means the 
algorithm has signaled that there is an outbreak, at which point the simulation will 
terminate.  If there is no outbreak signal from an algorithm, then the person is scheduled 
to the Susceptible Back To Susceptible event, meaning he or she goes to the hospital and 
there is nothing wrong with them, therefore they go back to being susceptible.   
(4) The Susceptible To Infected event.  The Susceptible To 
Infected event is a bookkeeping event.  If a person arrives to this event, that means they 
were susceptible and then became infected with anthrax due to a bioterror attack.  A time 
is recorded upon an arrival of a person to this event.  This is necessary in order to keep 
track of how long each person has been infected (T1).  After recording the time, the 
occurrence of this event will decrement the total number of Susceptible (S) by 1, and 
increment the total number of Infected (I) by 1.  Afterwards, the simulation schedules the 
person to transition to the Infected event.   
(5) The Infected event.  Given an infected person, he or she can 
either remain infected or go to the hospital.  The total transitional probabilities for these 
two events add up to 1.  Prior to the scheduling of these two events, the probability of an 
infected person going to the hospital seeking care (x5) needs to be updated.  This is done 
due to the fact that the longer a person is infected, the probability of them going to the 
hospital seeking care increases linearly as the day progresses.  Therefore: 
 
 updated x5 = original x5 + ((1 - original x5) * (T1 / x6)) (2) 
where 
• x5 is the probability of an infected person going to the hospital seeking care 
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• T1 is how long each patient has been infected 
• x6 is the maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to go to 
hospital seeking care 
Once the update of x5 is done, the scheduling of other events 
occurs, which depends on the result of drawing a random uniform variable U(0,1).  If U 
is greater than 0 and less than or equal to the updated x5,  then the person will transition to 
the Infected To Hospital event, meaning he or she has gone from being Infected to going 
to the hospital seeking care.  If that conditional statement is not true, then a person 
remains infected.    
(6) The Infected To Hospital event.  A person who shows up to this 
event means they were susceptible, became infected with anthrax due to a bioterror 
attack, and decided to go to the hospital seeking care.  The first step is to record how long 
they have been infected with anthrax prior to showing up to the hospital seeking care 
(T1).  This is done due to the fact that the longer a person is infected, the probability of 
correct diagnosis by the doctor (x4) increases linearly as the day progresses.   Therefore: 
 
 updated x4 = original x4 + ((1 - original x4) * (T1 / x7)) (3) 
where 
• x4 is the probability of correct diagnosis by the doctor 
• T1 is how long each patient has been infected 
• x7 is the maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to be 
correctly diagnosed 
Once the update of x4 is done, the scheduling of other events 
occurs, which depends on the result of drawing a random uniform variable U(0,1).  If U 
is greater than 0 and less than or equal to the updated x4, then the person will transition to 
the Correctly Diagnosed event, meaning an infected person goes to the hospital seeking 





the person will transition to the Incorrectly Diagnosed event and ultimately end up at the 
Infected event, meaning the doctor misdiagnoses the patient and the patient goes back to 
being infected with the anthrax disease.   
This event will also increment the total number at hospital (H) by 1 
and decrement the total number infected (I) by 1.  It will call the calculateC1() helper 
method to figure out the value of C1 statistic at that time. If C1 is greater than x3 
(threshold), it will schedule an ALGO Signal event.  This means the algorithm has 
signaled that there is an outbreak, at which point the simulation will terminate.  If there is 
no outbreak signal from an algorithm, then the person is scheduled to the Correctly 
Diagnosed or Incorrectly Diagnosed event,  
 
(7) The Incorrectly Diagnosed event.  If a doctor misdiagnoses a 
patient, then he or she will arrive to this event.  It will increment the total number of 
infected (I) by 1 and decrement the total number at the hospital (H) by 1.  After that, a 
person will transition to the Infected event, meaning an infected person receives an 
incorrect diagnosis by the doctor will go back to being infected with anthrax.   
(8) The ALGO Signal event.  The simulation will immediately 
terminate upon the occurrence of this event.  What will trigger the scheduling of this 
event is when C1 is greater than the threshold (x3).  There are only two times that C1 is 
calculated and then compared to the threshold.  Once a susceptible person arrives to the 
hospital seeking care, or an infected person arrives to the hospital seeking care, it will 
trigger the C1 statistic calculation.  In this event, the Boolean state variable A is changed 
from false to true and the time of the algorithm signal (tA) is recorded.  The time of the 
algorithm signal is recorded to answer the question of how many day(s) does it take for 
an algorithm to signal an anthrax outbreak. The time it takes for an algorithm to signal 
will then be compared to the time it takes for a doctor to signal.  Prior to ending the 
simulation, a daily report will be printed out detailing the number of susceptible (St), the 
number of infected (It), and the number at the hospital (Ht).    
(9) The DOC Signal event.  The simulation will immediately 
terminate upon the occurrence of this event.  What will trigger the scheduling of this 
event is when the doctor correctly diagnoses an infected patient.  In this event, the 
 27
Boolean state variable D is changed from false to true and the time of the doctor signal 
(tD) is recorded.  The time of the DOC signal is recorded to answer the question of how 
many day(s) does it take for a doctor to signal an anthrax outbreak. The time it takes for a 
doctor to signal will then be compared to the time it takes for an algorithm to signal.  
Prior to ending the simulation, a daily report will be printed out detailing the number of 
susceptible (St), the number of infected (It), and the number at the hospital (Ht).   
In order to run the simulation, a Java execution class called 
RunOutbreak is required. This is where all the parameters can be changed prior to the 
start of each simulation run.  Various statistical objects are created in order to keep track 
of the statistics of interest with a 95% confidence interval.  The statistics of interest are: 
average number of algorithm signals, average number of doctor signals, average number 
of days it takes for an algorithm signal, and average number of days it takes for a doctor 
signal.  Each simulation run consists of 10,000 replications.  Figure 11 illustrates a 
typical output print out as a result of the RunOutbreak class. 
 
RUN #1: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  874.6673 +/-  0.3439 
 Avg no. Infected:  43.8027 +/-  0.3289 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  81.5301 +/-  0.0493 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.1304 +/-  0.0066 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.8696 +/-  0.0066 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.5613 +/-  0.0496 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal:  4.1611 +/-  0.0077  
Figure 11.   Simulation outputs example 
2. Experimental Design 
In order to determine the settings of the parameters of the simulation at the start of 
each run, a D-optimal custom designed experiment with five factors resulting in 25 runs 
is chosen. JMP statistical software is utilized to generate the design matrix using the 
parameters in Table 1.  The D-optimal design is presented in Table 3 where: 
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• x1 is the probability of transitioning from susceptible to infected 
• x2 is the probability a susceptible person goes to hospital for non-anthrax 
related flu symptoms 
• x3 is the threshold 
• x7 is the maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to be 
correctly diagnosed 
• x6 is the maximum number of days an infected person is guaranteed to go 
to hospital seeking care 
There is a restriction placed on the values of x7 in relation to x6 in the sense that x6 








Run # x1 x2 x3 x7 x6
1 0.1000 0.1000 2.00 7.10 14.00
2 0.0010 0.0010 2.00 21.00 28.00
3 0.1000 0.1000 2.50 7.00 21.84
4 0.0010 0.0505 3.00 7.00 22.01
5 0.1000 0.0505 2.00 7.00 28.00
6 0.0505 0.0010 3.00 21.00 28.00
7 0.0505 0.1000 3.00 7.00 28.00
8 0.1000 0.1000 3.00 14.93 21.83
9 0.1000 0.0010 3.00 7.00 28.00
10 0.0010 0.1000 2.50 14.05 28.00
11 0.0505 0.0505 2.50 14.00 21.00
12 0.0010 0.1000 3.00 7.10 14.00
13 0.0010 0.1000 2.00 13.49 20.39
14 0.1000 0.0505 3.00 14.62 28.00
15 0.1000 0.1000 2.00 21.00 28.00
16 0.0010 0.0010 2.50 7.00 28.00
17 0.0010 0.0010 3.00 13.24 20.14
18 0.0010 0.1000 3.00 21.00 27.90
19 0.1000 0.0010 2.50 21.00 27.90
20 0.1000 0.0010 2.00 13.06 19.96
21 0.0505 0.0010 2.00 11.93 28.00
22 0.0010 0.1000 2.00 7.00 28.00
23 0.1000 0.0010 3.00 7.00 14.00
24 0.0010 0.0010 2.00 7.00 14.00
25 0.0505 0.0505 2.50 11.35 18.25  
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
There are two response variables of interest in the analysis of the simulation 
results: the probability of an algorithm signaling first and the number of days it takes for 
the algorithm to signal.  In the probability of algorithm signaling first case, there are two 
models: one for an initial exposed population of 1,000 people (Model 1) and one for 
10,000 exposed people (Model 2).  In the number of days it takes for the algorithm to 
signal case, there are two models: one for an initial exposed population of 1,000 (Model 
3) and one for 10,000 exposed people (Model 4). Prior to developing and analyzing the 
main effects of the four models, the general logistic regression model is explained.    
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
Logistic regression models the probability of an event or outcome (p) as  
0 1 1logit( ) ln 1 k k
pp x x
p
β β β⎛ ⎞≡ = + + +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ " .   (4) 
In this model, the log odds of p, often called the logit, is a linear function of the 
independent variables x1,…,xk.  Note that the odds of p, which is p/(1-p), can range from 
0 (when p=0) to infinity (when p=1), while the log odds has domain (-∞,+∞).  This 
relationship allows the independent variables to range over the whole real line while p is 
constrained to the unit interval (as a probability should be constrained).   
In Equation 4, we see that for positive coefficients ( 0 1, , , kβ β β… ) increases in the 
associated independent variable (holding all others constant) results in an increase in the 
log odds.  Similarly, for negative coefficients, decreases in the associated independent 
variable (holding all others constant) results in a decrease in the log odds.  Increasing log 
odds corresponds to increasing p. 
Solving Equation 4 for p and substituting the estimated coefficients (denoted 
as 0 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , kβ β β… ) resulting from fitting the logistic regression model to data gives in the 
following equation for estimating p: 
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( )0 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
1ˆ
1 k kx x
p
e β β β− + + +
=
+ "     (5) 
Using Equation 5, for a simple logistic regression model with one independent 
variable, we can plot x versus p and show that p is appropriately constrained to the unit 
interval.  For example, Figure 12 shows the resulting logistic curve for .2ˆ and 1ˆ 10 == ββ  
. 
 
Figure 12.   Plot of p =  1/(1+exp(-1-2x)) 
When estimating the probability p per Equation 5, increases in independent 
variables with positive coefficients correspond to increases in pˆ ; the larger the coefficient 
(holding all else constant), the more dramatically the probability changes from small 




Figure 13.   Plot of ( )( )11/ 1 exp 1p xβ= + − − for various values of β1 
The models resulting from the biosurveillance algorithm are not as simple as 
Equation 4, since they have quadratic and interaction terms in them.  Also, the models are 
not fit in the usual way, where one usually has observed some sort of binary outcome and 
the logistic regression model is fit as a generalized linear model.  Rather, in this case, we 
have estimated probabilities from the simulation and we fit the estimated log odds as a 
linear function of the various covariates using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
B. PROBABILITY OF ALGORITHM SIGNALING FIRST RESULTS 
In analyzing the probability of algorithm signaling first results, there are two 
versions: one for an initial exposed population of 1,000 people (Model 1) and one for 
10,000 exposed people (Model 2).  Main effects, interaction, and quadratic terms are 
included in both models.  JMP stepwise function is utilized to determine which terms are 
significant.  After each simulation run, the probability of algorithm signaling first is 
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estimated in the simulation.  Then, it is transformed into the logit in order to fit and 
analyze the models. Table 4 is a modified version of Table 1, with the variables used in 
the analysis.   
pˆ  estimated probability (from the simulation) that the algorithm signals first  
x1 probability of transitioning from susceptible to infected, 10.001 0.1x≤ ≤  
x2 probability a susceptible person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu 
symptoms, 20.001 0.1x≤ ≤  
x3 threshold, 32 3x≤ ≤  
x4 daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed, 
beginning at zero on the day of infection and increasing linearly up to a 
probability of one (when the infected person will have such obvious symptoms 
he or she is guaranteed to be correctly diagnosed), 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤  
x5 daily increase in the probability that an infected person goes to the hospital, 
where the probability increases linearly from zero to one (at which time the 
person is so sick he or she will definitely go to the hospital), 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤  
Table 4.   Analysis model variables 
1. Population Size of 1,000 (Model 1) 
Table 5 shows the results of 25 simulation runs, where 10,000 replications are 
executed within each run.  The time it takes to complete the simulation run is 36 hours 
using a personal computer laptop and a desktop. The probability of algorithm signaling 
first is estimated via the simulation, translated into the logit, and then entered into JMP 
































25 0.2227 ‐1.2500  
Table 5.   Probability of algorithm signaling first results (population size of 1,000) 
The probability of algorithm signaling first ranges from 0.1304 (lowest value in 
run number 1) to 0.9957 (highest value in run number 20).  Run numbers 1 and 20 have 
the same probability of transitioning from susceptible to infected state (x1 = 0.1) and the 
same threshold (x3 = 2).  They differ in the probability a susceptible person goes to the 
hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2).  In run number 1, the probability is higher at 0.1 
while it is at 0.001 for run number 20.  The daily increase in the probability an infected 
person will be correctly diagnosed (x4) and an infected person goes to the hospital (x5) in 
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run number 1 are both lower than in run number 20.  In run number 1, the daily increase 
in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed is 1/7and the daily 
increase in the probability that an infected person goes to the hospital is 1/14.  In run 
number 20, the daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly 
diagnosed is 1/13 and the daily increase in the probability that an infected person goes to 
the hospital is 1/20 days.     
The model is fit in JMP using stepwise regression, regressing the estimated logit 
on the various simulation parameters.  The results using OLS to fit the logit of the 
estimated probabilities to the covariates are seen in Equation 6.   















 In order to graphically depict the effects of the variables with the largest effect 
(x2, x3, and x4)  on the probability of algorithm signaling first, Figure 14 through 16 
shows the results for Model 1 where the other variables are set to their nominal values (x1 
= x2 = 0.05, x3 = 2.5, x4 = 1/14, x5 = 1/21) and then plot the estimated probability of 
algorithm signaling first as a function of the variables with the largest effect (x2, x3, and 












Figure 14.   Plot of Model 1 made by varying x2 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
 
Figure 15.   Plot of Model 1 made by varying x3 over its range while setting all other 




Figure 16.   Plot of Model 1 made by varying x4 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
The variables with the largest effect on the probability the algorithm signals first 
are x2 (probability going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu), x3 (threshold), and x4 
(daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed).  The 
results for x2 (probability going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu), x3 (threshold), 
and x4 (daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed) 
are in the expected direction:  
• As the probability of going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2) 
increases, the probability the algorithm signals first decreases, 
• As the threshold (x3) increases, the probability the algorithm signals first 
decreases, and 
• As the daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly 
diagnosed (x4) increases, the probability the algorithm signals first 
decreases. 
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Interestingly, the probability of people getting infected (x1) only modestly affects 
the probability the algorithm signals first, at least over the range of that variable.  This is 
a surprising result, as we expected that:  
• As the probability of people getting infected (x1) increases, we then 
expected that there would be more infected people going to the hospital 
that could be correctly diagnosed and thus the probability the algorithm 
signals first decreases. 
However, variable x1 is very modestly associated with a positive increase in the 
probability the algorithm signals first (though the increase is very small over the range of 
probabilities considered: 10.001 0.1x≤ ≤ ). And, since x5 is not in Model 1, the probability 
the algorithm signals first is not even associated with the daily increase in the probability 
infected persons go to the hospital (over the range considered: 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ ). 
A natural question is which levels of the variables maximize and minimize the 
probability that the algorithm signals first.  The probability the algorithm signals first is 
maximized ( pˆ  = 0.996) at the boundaries for each of the variables: x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.001, 
x3 = 2, and x4 = 1/21.  On the other hand, the probability the algorithm signals first is 
minimized ( pˆ  = 0.027) at x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.094, x3 = 3, and x4 = 1/21.  For both the 
maximization and minimization, since x5 is not in this model, it can take on any value 
between 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ . 
Model adequacy checks examining the residuals are seen in Figure 17 and 18.   
There is no pattern in the residuals, therefore the constant variance and independent 
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Figure 18.   Model 1 residual by row plot 
2. Population Size of 10,000 (Model 2) 
Table 6 shows the results of 25 simulation runs, where 10,000 replications are 
executed within each run.  The time it takes to complete the simulation run is 96 hours 
using a personal computer laptop and a desktop.  The probability of algorithm signaling 
first is estimated via the simulation, translated into the logit, and then entered into JMP 
































25 0.0444 ‐3.0691  
Table 6.   Probability of algorithm signaling first results (population size of 10,000) 
The probability of algorithm signaling first ranges from 0.0003 (lowest value in 
run number 8) to 1 (highest value in run number 19, 20, and 23).  According to the 
simulation results, the algorithm will always signal an outbreak first in run number 19, 
20, and 23.  Table 7 consists of the parameter values in the simulation run number 8, 19, 
20, and 23 for comparisons.   
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Parameter  Run #8 Run #19 Run #20 Run #23 
x1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
x2 0.1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
x3 3 2.5 2 3 
x4 1/14 1/21 1/13 1/7 
x5 1/21 1/27 1/19 1/14 
Table 7.   Model 2 parameters for simulation run number 8, 19, 20 and 23 
The four simulation runs (in Table 7) all have the same probability of 
transitioning from susceptible to infected state (x1 = 0.1).  Run number 19, 20, and 23 
(where the probability of algorithm signaling is 1) have the same probability a susceptible 
person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2 = 0.001).  However in run 
number 8 (where the probability of algorithm signaling is 0.0003), the probability a 
susceptible person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu is much higher (x2 = 
0.1).  Run number 8 and run number 23 have the same threshold (x3 = 2), while run 
number 19 has a threshold of 2.5 and run number 20 has a threshold of 2.  All four 
simulation runs differ in the daily increase in the probability an infected person will be 
correctly diagnosed (x4) and an infected person goes to the hospital (x5).  The daily 
increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed for runs number 
8, 19, 20, and 23 are 1/14, 1/21, 1/13, and 1/7 days respectively.  The daily increase in the 
probability an infected person goes to the hospital for runs number 8, 19, 20, and 23 are 
1/21, 1/27, 1/19, and 1/14 days respectively  
The model is fit in JMP using stepwise regression, regressing the estimated logit 
on the various simulation parameters.  The results using OLS to fit the logit of the 
estimated probabilities to the covariates are seen in Equation 7.   










  (7) 
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In order to graphically depict the effects of the variables with the largest effect 
(x1, x2, and x3)  on the probability of algorithm signaling first, Figure 19 through 21 
shows the results for Model 2 where the other variables are set to their nominal values (x1 
= x2 = 0.05, x3 = 2.5, x4 = 1/14, x5 = 1/21) and then plot the estimated probability of 
algorithm signaling first as a function of the variables with the largest effect (x1, x2, and 
x3).   
 




Figure 20.   Plot of Model 2 made by varying x2 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
 
 
Figure 21.   Plot of Model 2 made by varying x3 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
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The variable with the largest effect on the probability the algorithm signals first 
are x1 (probability of people getting infected), x2 (probability going to the hospital for 
non-anthrax related flu), and x3 (threshold).  The results for x1 (probability of people 
getting infected), x2 (probability going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu), and x3 
(threshold) are in the expected direction: 
• As the probability of people getting infected (x1) increases, we then 
expected that there would be more infected people going to the hospital 
that could be correctly diagnosed and thus the probability the algorithm 
signals first decreases,  
• As the probability of going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2) 
increases, the probability the algorithm signals first decreases to the point 
where x2 = 0.05, and 
• As the threshold(x3) is increased, the probability the algorithm signals first 
decreases. 
In this model, variables x4 (daily increase in the probability an infected person will 
be correctly diagnosed) and x5 (daily increase in the probability an infected person goes to 
the hospital) are not included.  Therefore, the probability the algorithm signals first is not 
associated with x4 (over the range considered: 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ ) and x5 (over the range 
considered: 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ ). 
The last step is to figure out which levels of the variables maximize and minimize 
the probability that the algorithm signals first.  The probability the algorithm signals first 
is maximized ( pˆ  = 0.999) at the boundaries for each of the variables: x1 = 0.001,  x2 = 
0.1, and x3 = 2.  On the other hand, the probability the algorithm signals first is 
minimized ( pˆ  = 0) at x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.069, and x3 = 3.  For both the maximization and 
minimization, since x4 and x5 are not in this model, therefore they can take on any values 
between 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ for x4 and 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ for x5. 
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Model adequacy checks examining the residuals are seen in Figure 22 and 23.   
There is no pattern in the residuals, therefore the constant variance and independent 
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Figure 23.   Plot of Model 2 residual by row plot 
3. Comparisons of Model 1 and 2 
In the comparisons of Model 1 and 2, only the main effects that are included in 
the models are analyzed.  Table 8 shows the regression coefficients for Model 1 (exposed 
population of 1,000 people) and Model 2 (exposed population of 10,000 people).  Both 
models’ regression coefficients are consistent in their direction.   
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Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
1 12.0385 21.4731 -48.3301 -3.6478 -78.8509 
2 5.879 33.419 -102.4512 -2.1464 n/a 
Table 8.   Model 1 and 2 regression coefficient comparisons 
The magnitude of β0, β1, and β2 decreases when going from Model 1 to Model 2, 
and the magnitude of β3 increases.  The probability the algorithm signals first is 
maximized at 0.996 and minimized at 0.027 for Model 1, while it is maximized at 0.999 
and minimized at 0 for Model 2.  Model 2 with an R square of 0.95 is a better regression 
line to fit the data than Model 1 with an R square of 0.92. 
C. NUMBER OF DAYS TO ALGORITHM SIGNALING RESULTS 
In the case of Model 1 and 2, the response variable is transformed into the logit 
for model fitting and analysis because probability needs to be constrained from 0 to 1.  
However, in the case of Model 3 and 4, it is not necessary to transform the number of 
days to algorithm signaling into the logit because number of days does not need to be 
constrained to the unit interval (though it does need to be non-negative).  Table 9 shows 
the results of 25 simulation runs for both scenarios: one for an initial exposed population 
of 1,000 people (Model 3) and one for 10,000 exposed people (Model 4).  Within each 
run, 10,000 replications are executed.  The number of days to algorithm signaling is 
































25 2.8078 1.5743  
Table 9.   Number of days to algorithm signaling results (population size of 1,000 and 
10,000) 
1. Population Size of 1,000 (Model 3) 
The number of days to algorithm signaling ranges from 1.4008 days (shortest time 
in run number 3) to 6.2687 days (longest time in run number 18).  Run numbers 3 and 18 
have the same probability a susceptible person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax 
related flu (x2 = 0.1).  They differ in the in the probability of transitioning from 
susceptible to infected state (x1), and the threshold (x3).  In run number 3, the probability 
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is higher at 0.1 while it is at 0.001 for run number 18.  The threshold in run number 3 is 
lower at 2.5 while the threshold for run number 18 is at 3.   The daily increase in the 
probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed (x4) and an infected person 
goes to the hospital (x5) in run number 3 are both lower than in run number 18.  In run 
number 3, the daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly 
diagnosed is 1/7 and the daily increase in the probability that an infected person goes to 
the hospital 1/22.  In run number 18, the daily increase in the probability an infected 
person will be correctly diagnosed is 1/21 and the daily increase in the probability that an 
infected person goes to the hospital is 1/28 days.     
The model is fit in JMP using stepwise regression, regressing the estimated logit 
on the various simulation parameters.  The results using OLS to fit the estimated number 
of days to algorithm signaling to the covariates are seen in Equation 8.   
Model 3: 1,000 people exposed with quadratic and interaction terms (R2=0.80) 
2
121 )(3063.438795.10908.692086.6ˆ xxxy +−−=     (8) 
In order to graphically depict the effects of the variables with the largest effect (x1 
and x2)  on the number of days to algorithm signaling, Figure 24 and 25 shows the results 
for Model 3 where the other variables are set to their nominal values (x1 = x2 = 0.05, x3 = 
2.5, x4 = 1/14, x5 = 1/21) and then plot the estimated number of days to algorithm 
signaling as a function of the variables with the largest effect (x1 and x2). 
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Figure 24.   Plot of Model 3 made by varying x1 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
 
Figure 25.   Plot of Model 3 made by varying x2 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
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The variable with the largest effect on the number of days to algorithm signals 
first are x1 (probability of people getting infected) and x2 (probability going to the hospital 
for non-anthrax related flu).  The results for x1 (probability of people getting infected and 
x2 (probability going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu) are not in the expected 
direction: 
• As the probability of people getting infected (x1) increases, the probability 
the algorithm signals first decreases and thus the number of days to 
algorithm signals first increases, and 
• As the probability of going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2) 
increases, the probability the algorithm signals first decreases and thus the 
number of days to algorithm signals first increases.  
In this model, variables x3 (threshold), x4 (daily increase in the probability an 
infected person will be correctly diagnosed) and x5 (daily increase in the probability an 
infected person goes to the hospital) are not included.  Therefore, the number of days to 
algorithm signals first is not associated with x3 (over the range considered: 32 3x≤ ≤ ), x4 
(over the range considered: 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ ) and x5 (over the range considered: 
51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ ). 
Determining which levels of the variables maximize and minimize the average 
time until the algorithm signals is the next step.  The number of days to algorithm signals 
first is maximized ( yˆ  = 6.13) at the boundaries for each of the variables: x1 = 0.001 and  
x2 = 0.001.  On the other hand, the number of days to algorithm signals first is minimized 
( yˆ  = 2.34) at x1 = 0.08 and x2 = 0.1.  For both the maximization and minimization, since 
x3, x4 and x5 are not in this model, therefore they can take on any values between 
32 3x≤ ≤ for x3, 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ for x4, and 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤ for x5. 
Model adequacy checks examining the residuals are seen in Figure 26 and 27.   
There is no pattern in the residuals, therefore the constant variance and independent 
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Figure 27.   Plot of Model 3 residual by row plot 
2. Population size of 10,000 (Model 4) 
The number of days to algorithm signaling ranges from 1.0576 days (shortest time 
in run number 14) to 4.1356 days (longest time in run number 17).  The probability of 
transitioning from susceptible to infected state (x1) and the probability a susceptible 
person goes to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2) are both higher in run number 
14 (x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.505) compared to run number 17 (x1 = 0.001, x2 = 0.001).  They have 
the same threshold of 3.  The daily increase in the probability an infected person will be 
correctly diagnosed (x4) and an infected person goes to the hospital (x5) in run number 17 
are both lower than in run number 14.  In run number 17, the daily increase in the 
probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed is 1/13 and the daily increase in 
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the probability that an infected person goes to the hospital 1/20.  In run number 14, the 
daily increase in the probability an infected person will be correctly diagnosed is 1/15 
days and the daily increase in the probability that an infected person goes to the hospital 
is 1/28.     
The model is fit in JMP using stepwise regression, regressing the estimated logit 
on the various simulation parameters.  The results using OLS to fit the estimated number 
of days to algorithm signaling to the covariates are seen in Equation 9.   
















  (9) 
In order to graphically depict the effects of the variables with the largest effect 
(x1, x2, x3, and x5) on the number of days to algorithm signaling, Figure 28 through 31 
shows the results for Model 4 where the other variables are set to their nominal values (x1 
= x2 = 0.05, x3 = 2.5, x4 = 1/14, x5 = 1/21) and then plot the estimated number of days to 
algorithm signaling as a function of the variables with the largest effect (x1, x2, x3, and x5). 
 
Figure 28.   Plot of Model 4 made by varying x1 over its range while setting all other 




Figure 29.   Plot of Model 4 made by varying x2 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
 
 
Figure 30.   Plot of Model 4 made by varying x3 over its range while setting all other 




Figure 31.   Plot of Model 4 made by varying x5 over its range while setting all other 
variables to their nominal values 
The variable with the largest effect on the number of days to algorithm signals 
first are x1 (probability of people getting infected), x2 (probability going to the hospital for 
non-anthrax related flu), x3 (threshold), and x5 (daily increase in the probability an 
infected person goes to the hospital).  The results for x1 (probability of people getting 
infected and x2 (probability going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu) and x5 (daily 
increase in the probability an infected person goes to the hospital) are in the expected 
direction: 
• As the probability of people getting infected (x1) increases, the probability 
the algorithm signals first decreases and thus the number of days to 
algorithm signals first increases,  
• As the probability of going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu (x2) 
increases, the probability the algorithm signals first decreases and thus the 
number of days to algorithm signals first increases, and  
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• As the daily increase in the probability an infected person goes to the 
hospital (x5) increases, the probability the algorithm signals first decreases 
and thus the number of days to algorithm signals first increases.   
Interestingly, Figure 18 shows that the threshold (x3) is not in the expected 
direction.  This is a surprising result, as we expected that:  
• As the threshold (x3) increases, the probability the algorithm signals first 
decreases and thus the number of days to algorithm signals first should 
increases.   
In this model, variable x4 (daily increase in the probability an infected person will 
be correctly diagnosed) is not included.  Therefore, the number of days to algorithm 
signals first is not associated with x4 (over the range considered: 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ ).  
The last question is which levels of the variables maximize and minimize the 
number of days to algorithm signals first.  The number of days to algorithm signals first 
is maximized ( yˆ  = 4.68) at the boundaries for each of the variables: x1 = 0.1, x2 = 0.1, x3 
= 2, and x5 = 1/14.  On the other hand, the number of days to algorithm signals first is 
minimized ( yˆ  = 0) at x1 = 0.025, x2 = 0.026, x3 = 3, and x5 = 1/28.  For both the 
maximization and minimization, since x4 is not in this model, therefore it can take on any 
values between 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ . 
Model adequacy checks examining the residuals are seen in Figures 32 and 33.  
There is no pattern in the residuals, therefore the constant variance and independent 
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Figure 33.   Plot of Model 4 residual by row plot 
3. Comparisons of Model 3 and 4 
In the comparisons of Model 3 and 4, only the main effects that are included in 
the model are being looked at.  Table 10 shows the regression coefficients for Model 3 
(exposed population of 1,000 people) and Model 4 (exposed population of 10,000 
people).  Both models’ regression coefficients are consistent in their direction.  However, 






Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 
3 6.2086 -69.908 -10.795 n/a n/a n/a 
4 2.5008 -17.0909 -6.6243 0.2167 -1.914 -2.953 
Table 10.   Model 3 and 4 regression coefficient comparisons 
The magnitude of β0 decreases when going from Model 3 to 4, and the magnitude 
of β1 and β2 increases when going from Model 3 to 4.  The number of days to algorithm 
signals first is maximized at 6.13 days and minimized at 2.34 days for Model 3, while it 
is maximized at 4.68 days and minimized at 0 for Model 4.  Model 4 with an R square of 




A. BIOSURVEILLANCE IS USEFUL FOR EED 
This research shows that biosurveillance statistical algorithms, such as the EARS 
C1, are useful in EED of a bioterror attack.  The metrics used to determine the 
effectiveness of the EARS C1 algorithm (as seen in Table 11) are the probability it 
signals an anthrax outbreak first and the time it takes to do so.  In the worst case 
scenarios, the probability the algorithm signals first is 13.04% for an exposed population 
of 1,000 people and it is 0.03% for an exposed population of 10,000 people.  In the 
nominal case scenarios, the probability the algorithm signals first is 31.5% for an exposed 
population of 1,000 people and it is 0.3% for an exposed population of 10,000 people. 
Although these probabilities may seem low, note that whether the algorithm signaled first 
was quite situation dependent.  And even in the worst case scenario for 1,000 people, the 
algorithm signaled first more than one time in 10.  Thus, at the very least biosurveillance 
is an effective back-up to clinicians.  On the other hand, there were scenarios in which the 
statistical algorithm almost always signaled first. 
Furthermore, the EARS C1 algorithm does not take a long time to signal an 
anthrax outbreak.  In the worst case scenarios, the longest time it takes for the algorithm 
to signal is 6.63 days for an exposed population of 1,000 people and 4.14 days for an 
exposed population of 10,000 people.  In the nominal case scenarios, the time it takes for 
the algorithm to signal is 3.3 days for an exposed population of 1,000 people and 0.38 

































1,000 0.1304 0.315 0.9957 1.4 3.3 6.63 
10,000 0.0003 .003 1 1.06 0.38 4.14 
Table 11.   Model 1 through Model 4 of the response variables results 
The ideal algorithm maximizes the probability it signals first while minimizes the 
time it takes to signal.  Table 12 gives the values of the parameters that maximize the 
probability the algorithm signals first.  In the case of an exposed population of 1,000 
people, x5 is not in the model thus it can be any value between the specified ranges.  In 
the case of an exposed population of 10,000 people, x4 and x5 are not in the model thus 
they can be any value between the specified ranges.  The probability the algorithm 
signals first is maximized at 99.6% for an exposed population of 1,000 people and 99.9% 
for an exposed population of 10,000 people. 
Population 
size 
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
1,000 0.1 0.001 2 1/21 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤
10,000 0.001 0.1 2 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤
Table 12.   Values of the parameters that maximize the probability the algorithm 
signals first 
Table 13 gives the values of the parameters that minimize the number of days it 
takes for an algorithm signal. In the case of an exposed population of 1,000 people, x3, x4, 
and x5 are not in the model thus they can be any value between the specified ranges.  In 
the case of an exposed population of 10,000 people, x4 is not in the model, thus it can be  
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any value between the specified ranges.  The time it takes to signal is minimized at 2.34 




x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 
1,000 0.08 0.1 32 3x≤ ≤  41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ 51/ 28 1/14x≤ ≤
10,000 0.025 0.026 3 41/ 21 1/ 7x≤ ≤ 1/28 
Table 13.   Values of the parameters that minimize the number of days to algorithm 
signal 
The parameters with the largest effect on the probability the algorithm signals first 
are the probability of people getting infected (x1), the probability of going to the hospital 
for non-anthrax related flu (x2), the threshold (x3), and the daily increase in the probability 
an infected person will be correctly diagnosed (x4).  An increase in the threshold and the 
transitional probabilities of people getting infected, going to the hospital for non-anthrax 
related flu and correct diagnosis by doctor result in a decrease in the probability the 
algorithm signals first, and thus an increase in the probability the doctor signals first. This 
finding is consistent with Professor Fricker’s simulation results in the sense that as the 
higher the probability of correct diagnosis by doctor, the less likely the statistical 
algorithm is to signal first.   
The parameters with the largest effect on the number of days to algorithm signal 
are the probability of people getting infected (x1), the probability of going to the hospital 
for non-anthrax related flu (x2), the threshold (x3), and the daily increase in the probability 
an infected person goes to the hospital (x5). An increase in the transitional probabilities of 
people getting infected, going to the hospital for non-anthrax related flu and an infected 
person goes to the hospital result in an increase in the time it takes for the algorithm to 
signal.   
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
In this thesis, two exposed population sizes of 1,000 and 10,000 people are 
explored in the simulation model analysis.  The results suggest a possibility of a 
population size effect in the sense that the larger the population size, the lower the 
probability of an algorithm to signal first.  In order to better characterize the region where 
biosurveillance is useful (as seen in Figure 1), different population sizes should be 
evaluated.  Additionally, the five simulation parameters were evaluated over a small 
range for their values.  While these ranges were judged to be the most likely, it would be 
interesting to investigate the effects of a wider range for these parameters. 
There are many biosurveillance statistical algorithms that can be implemented in 
the simulation model such as the EARS C2 and C3, the CUSUM, and the Shewhart.  The 
simulation model in this thesis only implements the EARS C1 statistical algorithm.  
There could be interesting insights in comparing the performance among various 
statistical algorithms.  Furthermore, while it is not necessary to model the probability the 
doctor signals first, since it is 1 minus the probability the algorithm signals first, the 
number of days to doctor signal can still be modeled to explore the effect of the variables 
that are significant.   
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APPENDIX A. OUTPUTS (POPULATION SIZE OF 1,000) 
For a population size of 1,000 people, 25 simulation runs is executed. Each 
simulation run consists of 10,000 replications. 
RUN #1: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  874.6673 +/-  0.3439 
 Avg no. Infected:  43.8027 +/-  0.3289 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  81.5301 +/-  0.0493 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.1304 +/-  0.0066 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.8696 +/-  0.0066 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.5613 +/-  
0.0496 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  998.1784 +/-  0.0214 
 Avg no. Infected:  0.9739 +/-  0.0189 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8477 +/-  0.0057 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9390 +/-  0.0047 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0610 +/-  0.0047 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.9279 +/-  
0.0611 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  868.7775 +/-  0.2955 
 Avg no. Infected:  49.8837 +/-  0.2884 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  81.3388 +/-  0.0478 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0524 +/-  0.0044 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9476 +/-  0.0044 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.4008 +/-  
0.0585 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal:  4.2956 +/-  
0.0093 
 
RUN #4:  
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
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 Avg no. Susceptible:  953.9723 +/-  0.0492 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.4709 +/-  0.0172 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  44.5568 +/-  0.0399 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2810 +/-  0.0088 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7190 +/-  0.0088 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.7434 +/-  
0.1035 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  911.7260 +/-  0.4776 
 Avg no. Infected:  45.4950 +/-  0.4670 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  42.7790 +/-  0.0382 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2490 +/-  0.0085 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7510 +/-  0.0085 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.8281 +/-  
0.0462 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  976.8183 +/-  0.2171 
 Avg no. Infected:  22.2274 +/-  0.2128 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.9543 +/-  0.0073 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9320 +/-  0.0049 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0680 +/-  0.0049 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.4975 +/-  
0.0212 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  885.8269 +/-  0.1909 
 Avg no. Infected:  31.8395 +/-  0.1815 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  82.3335 +/-  0.0465 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0373 +/-  0.0037 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9627 +/-  0.0037 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.0751 +/-  
0.1193 
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 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal:  4.7316 +/-  
0.0126 
RUN #8: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  860.1158 +/-  0.3125 
 Avg no. Infected:  58.5347 +/-  0.3082 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  81.3495 +/-  0.0464 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0241 +/-  0.0030 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9759 +/-  0.0030 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.4523 +/-  
0.1105 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  964.9003 +/-  0.2958 
 Avg no. Infected:  34.1795 +/-  0.2923 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.9202 +/-  0.0069 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9178 +/-  0.0054 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0822 +/-  0.0054 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.1122 +/-  
0.0163 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal:  4.0231 +/-  
0.0103 
RUN #10: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  913.6131 +/-  0.0715 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.6930 +/-  0.0220 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  84.6939 +/-  0.0577 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.3903 +/-  0.0096 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.6097 +/-  0.0096 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  5.4399 +/-  
0.1008 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  924.7160 +/-  0.2904 
 Avg no. Infected:  31.7611 +/-  0.2738 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  43.5228 +/-  0.0392 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2263 +/-  0.0082 
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 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7737 +/-  0.0082 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.9076 +/-  
0.0691 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  913.8416 +/-  0.0576 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.3499 +/-  0.0141 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  84.8086 +/-  0.0512 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.1694 +/-  0.0074 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.8306 +/-  0.0074 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.6930 +/-  
0.1194 






 Avg no. Susceptible:  915.1090 +/-  0.0734 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.1578 +/-  0.0191 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  83.7332 +/-  0.0611 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.6307 +/-  0.0095 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.3693 +/-  0.0095 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.7476 +/-  
0.0710 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  895.4357 +/-  0.3960 
 Avg no. Infected:  61.5230 +/-  0.3877 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  43.0413 +/-  0.0364 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0739 +/-  0.0051 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9261 +/-  0.0051 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.3112 +/-  
0.1147 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
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 Avg no. Susceptible:  998.2334 +/-  0.0199 
 Avg no. Infected:  0.9150 +/-  0.0173 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8516 +/-  0.0058 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9353 +/-  0.0048 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0647 +/-  0.0048 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.7824 +/-  
0.0574 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  997.9773 +/-  0.0215 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.1488 +/-  0.0185 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8739 +/-  0.0059 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.7409 +/-  0.0086 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.2591 +/-  0.0086 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.9935 +/-  
0.0649 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  997.7239 +/-  0.0227 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.3561 +/-  0.0191 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.9200 +/-  0.0062 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.6810 +/-  0.0091 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.3190 +/-  0.0091 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  5.7182 +/-  
0.0708 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  912.3599 +/-  0.0665 
 Avg no. Infected:  2.1806 +/-  0.0232 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  85.4595 +/-  0.0525 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2356 +/-  0.0083 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7644 +/-  0.0083 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  6.2687 +/-  
0.1449 
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Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  968.1928 +/-  0.3108 
 Avg no. Infected:  30.9146 +/-  0.3077 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8926 +/-  0.0066 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9845 +/-  0.0024 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0155 +/-  0.0024 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.9908 +/-  
0.0174 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  974.1262 +/-  0.2674 
 Avg no. Infected:  25.0157 +/-  0.2653 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8580 +/-  0.0063 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9957 +/-  0.0013 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0043 +/-  0.0013 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.6989 +/-  
0.0162 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  982.2369 +/-  0.2077 
 Avg no. Infected:  16.8805 +/-  0.2051 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8826 +/-  0.0064 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9694 +/-  0.0034 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0306 +/-  0.0034 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.0096 +/-  
0.0218 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  915.2453 +/-  0.0717 
 Avg no. Infected:  1.1097 +/-  0.0182 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  83.6450 +/-  0.0604 
 
 69
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.6041 +/-  0.0096 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.3959 +/-  0.0096 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.4969 +/-  
0.0685 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  971.5566 +/-  0.2045 
 Avg no. Infected:  27.5650 +/-  0.2021 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8784 +/-  0.0064 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9866 +/-  0.0023 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0134 +/-  0.0023 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.8659 +/-  
0.0120 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  998.3674 +/-  0.0167 
 Avg no. Infected:  0.7747 +/-  0.0140 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  0.8578 +/-  0.0058 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.8637 +/-  0.0067 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.1363 +/-  0.0067 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.2619 +/-  
0.0510 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  926.9914 +/-  0.2653 
 Avg no. Infected:  29.4859 +/-  0.2480 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  43.5227 +/-  0.0397 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2227 +/-  0.0082 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7773 +/-  0.0082 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.8078 +/-  
0.0665 
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APPENDIX B. OUTPUTS (POPULATION SIZE OF 10,000) 
For a population size of 10,000 people, 25 simulation runs is executed. Each 
simulation run consists of 10,000 replications. 
RUN #1: 
 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  8731.7465 +/-  1.0473 
 Avg no. Infected:  451.5045 +/-  1.0276 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  816.7490 +/-  0.1477 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0187 +/-  0.0027 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9813 +/-  0.0027 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.7861 +/-  
0.0589 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9984.5573 +/-  0.1195 
 Avg no. Infected:  6.4804 +/-  0.1087 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.9622 +/-  0.0205 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.8390 +/-  0.0072 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.1610 +/-  0.0072 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.6729 +/-  
0.0452 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  8725.6673 +/-  0.4530 
 Avg no. Infected:  459.6378 +/-  0.4295 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  814.6949 +/-  0.1486 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0023 +/-  0.0009 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9977 +/-  0.0009 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.4348 +/-  
0.2192 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9548.2434 +/-  0.1962 
 Avg no. Infected:  8.9145 +/-  0.0673 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  442.8421 +/-  0.1500 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.1086 +/-  0.0061 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.8914 +/-  0.0061 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.3637 +/-  
0.0951 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9126.8494 +/-  2.5781 
 Avg no. Infected:  443.9956 +/-  2.5345 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  429.1550 +/-  0.1235 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0844 +/-  0.0054 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9156 +/-  0.0054 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.1991 +/-  
0.0272 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9844.1701 +/-  1.0238 
 Avg no. Infected:  146.8568 +/-  1.0155 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.9732 +/-  0.0205 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9788 +/-  0.0028 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0212 +/-  0.0028 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.9137 +/-  
0.0112 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  8934.9395 +/-  0.3315 
 Avg no. Infected:  241.5711 +/-  0.2994 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  823.4894 +/-  0.1491 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0014 +/-  0.0007 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9986 +/-  0.0007 
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 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.8571 +/-  
0.3086 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  8724.7995 +/-  0.2571 
 Avg no. Infected:  452.5076 +/-  0.2214 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  822.6929 +/-  0.1475 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0003 +/-  0.0003 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9997 +/-  0.0003 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.3333 +/-  
1.4342 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9721.7984 +/-  1.3892 
 Avg no. Infected:  269.3565 +/-  1.3854 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.8451 +/-  0.0188 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9998 +/-  0.0003 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0002 +/-  0.0003 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.8658 +/-  
0.0092 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9145.1221 +/-  0.3014 
 Avg no. Infected:  10.8172 +/-  0.0873 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  844.0607 +/-  0.2334 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.1383 +/-  0.0068 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.8617 +/-  0.0068 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.8886 +/-  
0.0873 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9320.5834 +/-  1.1333 
 Avg no. Infected:  245.1088 +/-  1.0725 
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 Avg no. At The Hospital:  434.3078 +/-  0.1305 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0488 +/-  0.0042 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9512 +/-  0.0042 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.5246 +/-  
0.0758 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9151.6558 +/-  0.2248 
 Avg no. Infected:  7.9654 +/-  0.0523 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  840.3788 +/-  0.1921 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0538 +/-  0.0044 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9462 +/-  0.0044 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.3234 +/-  
0.0971 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9151.1031 +/-  0.3326 
 Avg no. Infected:  8.8764 +/-  0.0852 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  840.0205 +/-  0.2633 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2771 +/-  0.0088 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7229 +/-  0.0088 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.6536 +/-  
0.0570 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9092.1364 +/-  1.2156 
 Avg no. Infected:  478.1780 +/-  1.1903 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  429.6856 +/-  0.1163 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0139 +/-  0.0023 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9861 +/-  0.0023 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.0576 +/-  
0.0437 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  8721.8274 +/-  1.3847 
 Avg no. Infected:  464.5901 +/-  1.3847 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  813.5825 +/-  0.1489 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0181 +/-  0.0026 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9819 +/-  0.0026 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.7403 +/-  
0.0641 





Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9983.4946 +/-  0.1002 
 Avg no. Infected:  7.4277 +/-  0.0903 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  9.0777 +/-  0.0198 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.5377 +/-  0.0098 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.4623 +/-  0.0098 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.6251 +/-  
0.0502 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9981.8387 +/-  0.1007 
 Avg no. Infected:  8.8777 +/-  0.0898 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  9.2835 +/-  0.0199 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.4293 +/-  0.0097 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.5707 +/-  0.0097 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.1356 +/-  
0.0586 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9140.2920 +/-  0.2857 
 Avg no. Infected:  12.5356 +/-  0.0916 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  847.1724 +/-  0.2157 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0770 +/-  0.0052 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9230 +/-  0.0052 
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 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  4.2740 +/-  
0.1333 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9739.9407 +/-  1.8247 
 Avg no. Infected:  251.2507 +/-  1.8204 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.8085 +/-  0.0191 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  1.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.7474 +/-  
0.0122 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal: -7.0000 +/- ? 
 
RUN #20: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9771.6956 +/-  2.2940 
 Avg no. Infected:  219.5363 +/-  2.2893 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.7681 +/-  0.0193 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  1.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.5368 +/-  
0.0155 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal: -7.0000 +/- ? 
 
RUN #21: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9877.8940 +/-  1.2423 
 Avg no. Infected:  113.2931 +/-  1.2367 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.8129 +/-  0.0198 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.9987 +/-  0.0007 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0013 +/-  0.0007 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.5387 +/-  
0.0158 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9152.6061 +/-  0.3130 
 Avg no. Infected:  8.3418 +/-  0.0775 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  839.0521 +/-  0.2517 
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 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.2444 +/-  0.0084 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.7556 +/-  0.0084 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.4865 +/-  
0.0585 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9722.4944 +/-  1.3986 
 Avg no. Infected:  268.6586 +/-  1.3949 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.8470 +/-  0.0188 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  1.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.0000 +/-  0.0000 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  2.8623 +/-  
0.0093 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Doc Signal: -7.0000 +/- ? 
 
RUN #24: 
Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9986.1669 +/-  0.0848 
 Avg no. Infected:  4.8968 +/-  0.0745 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  8.9364 +/-  0.0203 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.7421 +/-  0.0086 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.2579 +/-  0.0086 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  3.0838 +/-  
0.0377 




Using 10000 independent replications, 95% CI for following measures as 
followed: 
 Avg no. Susceptible:  9322.9228 +/-  0.9899 
 Avg no. Infected:  242.4855 +/-  0.9332 
 Avg no. At The Hospital:  434.5917 +/-  0.1270 
 
 AVG NO. OF ALGORITHM SIGNALS:  0.0444 +/-  0.0040 
 AVG NO. OF DOCTOR SIGNALS:  0.9556 +/-  0.0040 
 
 AVG No. of Days from Susceptible to Algo Signal:  1.5743 +/-  
0.0771 
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